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Town Meeting



BULLETIN OF AMERICA'S TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR

BROADCAST BY STATIONS OF THE AMERICAN BROADCASTING CO.



What Should Be Our Policy in China?

Moderator, GEORGE V. DENNY. JR.

Speakers

DONALD NELSON

WALTER H. JUDD

VINCENT SHEEAN

THEODORE WHITE

COMING

—January 3, 1946—

What Must We Do To Denazify the German People?

—January 10, 1945—

Should Congress Approve the Proposed Loan To Britain?

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THE BROADCAST OF JANUARY 3:

"What Must We Do To Denazify the German People?"



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"Should Congress Approve the Proposed Loan To Britain?"

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GEORGE V. DENNY, JR., MODERATOR



DECEMBER 27, 1945

VOL. 11, No. 35

What Should Be Our Policy In China?

Announcer:

Town Hall, the American Broadcasting Company, and Station WTRY in cooperation with television station WRGB, welcome you to another stirring session of America's Town Meeting — the program that gives both sides of questions affecting your life and mine. It's television night on America's Town Meeting and we invite you to join us here in the television studio of the General Electric Company in Schenectady, New York.

This is our second visit to station WRGB and this brilliantly lighted studio is packed with Town Meeting fans. About the floor between the audience and stage are three movable television cameras, which will bring the pictures of this nationally famous radio forum into the homes of all who have television sets within the range of WRGB through station WTRY and the American Broadcasting Company's television department.

The rest of you will hear your favorite radio forum as usual, presided over by the president of Town Hall, the founder and moderator of America's Town Meeting, Mr. George V. Denny, Jr. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Good evening, neighbors and fellow stockholders in the greatest business enterprise on earth, the United States of America. As stockholders in this great enterprise, we have something to say about its policies and we're in the process now of making some of the gravest policy decisions we ever made in our entire history.

Because of our position as the richest and most powerful nation in the world today, every decision we make in the field of international affairs is watched with keenest interest by every other nation in the world.

Tonight we consider, "What Should Be Our Policy in China?" Many of us have forgotten that

World War II actually started in China in 1931 when Japan invaded Manchuria and took this industrially rich section of China with its 39,000,000 population comprising over half a million square miles by force of arms.

After having successfully defied the League of Nations in this step, the greedy hands of Japanese imperialists reached out again in 1937 for further conquests in China. While the people of China were seeking to defend themselves from the ravages of this foreign foe, internal strife, bordering on civil war, was held in check only until the Japs laid down their arms in defeat last July.

Indeed, there were some who accused the Chinese Nationalist Government under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of holding back in his war against Japan in order to protect his government against growing power of the Chinese Communists in Northern China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung.

In spite of urgent efforts by allies to help bring about unity in China, the situation grew worse until some reliable authorities predicted that the only solution was two Chinas, one led by Mao Tse-tung in the north and one headed by Chiang Kai-shek in the south.

However, the United States has consistently supported the Nationalist Government of Chiang and made this concrete in terms of

a loan of \$500,000,000 and active support of Chiang's armed forces against our common enemy, Japan.

The recent sensational resignation of Ambassador Hurley on the grounds that this policy was being sabotaged by certain State Department officials whom he named, gave dramatic emphasis to the importance of this vexing question which most certainly contains in it the seeds of another world conflict.

So tonight we've asked four distinguished experts to tell us more about this urgent problem and to answer our questions. Congressman Walter Judd, Republican from Minnesota, a former medical missionary to China, is recognized as one of the foremost authorities in this country on this question. Donald Nelson, now president of the Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers, was sent as President Roosevelt's personal representative to China in 1944, and continues to serve in his capacity as high economic advisor to the Chinese government. These two gentlemen hold strongly to the view that we must continue to support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's regime.

It was Theodore White, as head of *Time* magazine's news service in China, who broke the first big news stories in this country of the great cleavage in China between this government and its people. His views are strongly supported

by another able foreign correspondent and author, only recently out of the uniform of our armed forces, Colonel Vincent Sheean. So let's hear first from the Congressman from Minnesota, the Honorable Walter Judd. Mr. Judd. (*Applause.*)

Congressman Judd:

The first reason, Mr. Denny, why we must continue our long-standing policy of supporting the government of China is our national honor. We must make good on our promises. I am shocked that Mr. Sheean and Mr. White should actually propose that we withdraw from China before we have safely carried out commitments we assumed there, such as expelling the Japanese and restoring to China the territories, including Manchuria, which Japan seized from her. These commitments, as President Truman reminded us only twelve days ago, were made to the National Government of China, the government headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

I, as a responsible member of the United States Government, cannot even consider as a serious possibility, any suggestion that my Nation will betray its honor. If we go back on our solemn promises to an ally which fought so faithfully by our side, then are there any promises on which we won't go back, if a large enough pressure group demands it?

Is there any nation that could or ought to trust us again, not only in Asia but in Europe and Latin America as well?

Is there any possible hope for peace if the world cannot depend on a nation's pledged word?

But even if our honor were not involved, our national interests require that we continue to support the Chinese Government. Having fought four long years to keep Japan from getting control of China, can we now afford to throw away that hard-bought victory by abandoning China to Communist control?

Most of the leaders around Chiang Kai-shek from the Prime Minister T. V. Soong on down, were educated in our country. They want to make China as near like our country as possible. Not a one of the Chinese Communist leaders is a returned student from America. Most of them got their training under Russian Communists. Can anyone conceivably imagine that China under the Communists will be oriented primarily in our direction, either politically or economically?

Some Americans have supposed that the surrender of Japan meant the end of our responsibilities in Asia. As a matter of fact, whether we win the war there so it will stay won, will be determined by what pattern dominates in the development of China. Is it to be the racial pattern, as Japan advo-

cated, the colored people against the whites? Are the Chinese to be driven in disillusionment into the Communist pattern? Or will they have a chance to develop a genuine democracy, more nearly after the pattern we helped establish in the Philippines, which is what the overwhelming majority of them unquestionably want?

There is no more important question in the world and the answer is still in our hands. Why do you think our Marines and our supplies are in China? For China's sake or for Chiang Kai-shek's sake? Most emphatically, no!

They are there for America's sake. They are there because of urgent necessity from the standpoint of our own future security. They are there not because we don't want our boys home but because we *do* want them home—and able to stay home.

A serious civil war in China is against our interests because that would create chaos and a political vacuum in which some outside power would certainly intervene. The surest way to avoid such a disastrous civil war is for the United States to continue to support firmly our ally—the National Government of China.

Russia has pledged both moral and material assistance to that government, so she certainly cannot object to our assisting it, too. Without outside support, the Communists cannot wage serious civil

war. Their argument that we must withdraw support from Chiang in order to avoid civil war is wholly fallacious. Actually, for us to withdraw support from him would make civil war almost certain because it would give the Communists some hope of success.

If Mr. Sheean and Mr. White claim that to support the Chinese government is intervening in China's internal affairs, surely they know that it is not possible for any nation with such power as ours to escape having enormous influence on one side or the other in any major issue in the world.

If our influence is not on one side, then automatically it is on the other. I am a doctor. If I decide to operate in a case of appendicitis and the patient dies, it was my decision to operate which led to his death. But if I decide not to operate and the appendix ruptures and the patient dies, it was my decision not to operate which led to his death. Both were decisions.

If to continue support of Chiang is to intervene on his side, then to withdraw our support is to intervene on the Communists' side. The only choice we have is, are we to be by decision on the side of our own American interests, or are we to be by default on the side that is avowedly determined to set up a social, political, and economic order which is the very antithesis of that in which we believe?

The recent restatement by President Truman of our China policy should enable General Marshall and all of us to get the facts as to who in China really wants unity and who doesn't. If the Communists agree to become a political party without an autonomous army and Chiang refuses to establish a democratic government with legal and equal status for all parties, then he is exposed and ought to be. If, on the other hand, he is willing to establish such a government and the Communists are unwilling to give up their separate army and become a loyal opposition instead of an armed rebellion, then their pretenses are exposed and ought to be.

I am confident of the outcome of this test because I believe completely in the sincerity of Chiang's desire to achieve a unified democratic China without any further warfare. If there are risks in supporting him, there are far greater risks in not supporting him. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Congressman Judd. Well, I think Colonel Sheean looks at this question slightly differently, and, as we believe in hearing both sides, let's hear from this famous foreign correspondent and author, Colonel Vincent Sheean. Colonel Sheean. (*Applause.*)

Colonel Sheean:

Mr. Judd's respect for the international engagements of our Gov-

ernment would be echoed even by those who question their concrete application in this case. The Cairo promises were made to Chiang Kai-shek, of course, but to Chiang Kai-shek as a representative of United China in wartime.

The Chiang Kai-shek who now wishes to wipe out all opposition is a different concept even though he may be the same man. As a matter of fact, throughout history, it has been found necessary to make continuous and always flexible adjustments towards a country which, like China, has been going through a long process of revolutionary turmoil and change.

I don't know really what Mr. Judd means by serious civil war, but I do know that a civil war has been practically incessant in China since 1911 in one form or another, and this is the first time that we have been told that it is our duty to intervene in it. Moreover, Mr. Judd tells us tonight that if we do not intervene, by merely minding our own business we shall be aiding the Communists. This is a new idea in international relations, and, incidentally, it casts a strange light on Chiang Kai-shek's claim to national leadership. Is he so weak that he cannot function at all without American and Japanese support?

Mr. Judd may have forgotten that at a rather similar period in our history—that is, at the end of the first World War—we com-

mitted one of the principal errors possible to us. That is, we intervened in the Russian Civil War on the side of the Czar. We did not intervene strongly enough to impose the Czarist regime on the Russian people, but we intervened strongly enough to give that people a permanent grievance—a solid reason for disliking us throughout the years.

Now we are intervening in China in accordance with the Hurley policy. It makes no difference what the politicians call it; in reality, it is intervention. We are transporting troops of Chiang Kai-shek to areas where they have never been before—not merely protecting, supplying, and helping to organize these bands, but actually installing them in territory where they have never before set foot. What form of legality or international law or common ordinary decency this is cannot be explained to simple people. It looks like plain, high-handed interference with the destiny of China. What else it is must be left to the sophists of Washington to discover.

Of course, the whole official legend of China in the World War has been eyewash right from the beginning. The Chinese Nationalist Government—so-called—has been in this game very largely for private profit and public acclaim, but not for the sake of the possible victory over Japan. That job they

entrusted to us on Pearl Harbor Day.

The troops of the National Government have, except for General Stilwell's two divisions, never been properly trained or equipped and they scarcely knew who their enemy was. At this moment they are deserting in considerable numbers—sometimes to the Communists, sometimes to guerilla bands with a more spacious life, and sometimes merely to go home.

Chiang Kai-shek actually depends for the garrison and guard duty of important centers and railroads upon the Japanese. He has 250,000 of these so-called enemy troops, if they ever were his enemies, in his service today, and without them he could not even keep that modicum of order which does obtain in the Kuomintang areas of China.

Our policy has been to support Chiang Kai-shek, whatever happens and against any possible change in the situation. This policy takes no account of reality. We pretend that Chiang Kai-shek is the legal government in China.

What made it legal? Who elected Chiang Kai-shek?

Why is it different now from what it was in 1927 when we did not recognize this government?

In what way does the government of Chiang Kai-shek differ from that of a fascist dictatorship? It is, of course, much less efficient and much less beneficent, but, po-

litically speaking, it is the same brand of dictatorship, with authority centered in one man, and that man is himself so limited in knowledge, aspirations, and ideation that he has been unable in 20 years to unite a serious majority of the Chinese people.

Obviously, the only course which would make the slightest sense to us would be to induce the Chinese factions to come together in a coalition. It would not be a comfortable coalition, and neither of the two great parties, Kuomintang and Communists, would feel able to give complete trust to it. That doesn't matter.

The alternative is to continue the civil strife which has torn up China for the past 35 years. The Chinese people, so brave and true, deserve something better than that. The qualities of this people do not include political capacity, collectively speaking, but that will come in time. All the rest, China has—fortitude, strength, endurance, grace, and a supple understanding sort of wisdom. We should be doing our duty as friends if we brought about, or even compelled, a truce between those who divide the energies of this wonderful people. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Vincent Sheean. I know just what some of you are thinking now. How much simpler it would be, how much easier it would be, if we didn't have to

listen to both sides—if somebody would just tell us what is right and what is wrong between these two. But unfortunately life is not that simple, so here is another expert on China, a distinguished American businessman, formerly head of the War Production Board, now President of the Society of Independent Motion Picture Producers, and high economic advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Donald Nelson. Mr. Nelson. (*Applause.*)

Mr. Nelson:

An enlightened policy towards China, in my opinion, affords a great opportunity for the United States to ensure the preservation of peace in the world. China is our friend today. She is looking to the United States, to lead her to democracy, to show her how to improve the living standards of her people. With our help she can continue to be one of the four great powers of the world. There are over 400,000,000 people in China — hard-working, good-humored friends of the United States. They believe in us, respect us, and we cannot afford to let them fall into bad hands and be turned against us.

Mr. Sheean, I have spent weeks with the Generalissimo, and I am positive that he wants to see a true democracy in China. He is a practical, realistic leader. We must understand and sympathize with the problems he faces.

We know that a democracy depends on an informed people. How can we expect China to be a democracy, no matter how much she wants to, unless she has the means to inform her people of the issues she faces? China today has no means of communication. Throughout the vast lands which 400,000,000 people occupy, they have no good roads, no telegraph, no radio, no telephones, few railroads, few newspapers, and very few books and magazines.

In addition, let me point out that less than 25 per cent, less than one quarter, of the people of China are able to read or write. In my opinion, China needs "know-how" in tackling her enormous problems.

The Chinese have not had training or experience in administration. They need help—considerate, sympathetic help—in teaching them good administration, and with that, they will make the grade with flying colors.

I know the weaknesses of China. I know its faults. They have over 4,000 years of recorded history, and those of you who listen to me, that have studied the history of the world, know that the vast empire of China has never been united. It has been ruled by war lords who fought each other, outsmarted each other, and stole from each other. But today, this is pretty well behind them. A revolution has been fought by the people for

28 years, and just when the revolution was beginning to succeed, Japan, for eight years, ground them down to the dust with superior weapons and trained, fiendish, barbaric soldiers.

The war with Japan is over, and China, although prostrate, wants to take her place in the world and is extending her hands to us for help. We, in our own interest, must respond.

China must, of course, be united. Unless there is unity, the United States can pursue no constructive policy in building up China.

The Communists today are the largest dissenting force in China. The Russians, who are as realistic and as factual as anyone, told us that they were not interested in the Chinese Communists. The Russians called them pseudo-Communists and said they were peasants of a very low financial status, who, when their status was improved even slightly, would no longer be Communists.

If we, with the know-how we have, can help China to develop her natural resources and improve the living standards of her people, I am positive that unity will follow. We must sympathetically teach the Chinese how to build a communication system, railroads, radio, roads, so that they can get to know and evaluate their leaders.

We must help the Chinese to institute a mass education system so that they can learn to read and

write. We must help the Chinese develop newspapers, magazines, books, and motion pictures.

I know I am outlining a tremendous program, but it is my sincere belief that it can be done. At the start, I said that, in a way, this was for our own selfish interest. As the Chinese improve their status, they will become good customers for our factories making locomotives, machine tools, and other types of capital goods. But even more important, a strong China, peace-loving as she is, will help the world live in peace. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Donald Nelson. Now we hear from a man who spent six years in China as head of *Time* magazine's news service and one of the first to break the news of the Chinese Communists in the American press, Mr. Theodore White. Mr. White. (*Applause.*)

Mr. White:

I don't know what General Marshall took with him in that big C-54 plane he flew to China, but in Chungking during the war, we used to say there were two things that every American ought to have when he came to Chungking: a crystal ball and a copy of *Alice In Wonderland*.

Now I submit that General Marshall is bound to fail unless he took along with him one thing more—a very sharp memory of our

own Declaration of Independence and that particular phrase, "that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." General Marshall can succeed, but he can succeed only by reversing the entire trend of American policy in Asia during the past year.

Our foreign policy has failed to ask the most important question of all—What do the people of China want? The most important man in these negotiations, Dr. Judd, is not Chiang Kai-shek nor Mao Tseh-tung, nor American-trained or Moscow-trained students. It's a little fellow whom I call Lao Wong. He's the Chinese "John Q. Public." He's the average peasant.

For decades this man has been pushed around and beaten up, kicked about like a dog, by a brutal and inefficient government. For fifteen years, as a result, there's been a civil war going on in China. This civil war doesn't stem from any underground conspiracy, but from the fact that the Chinese peasant is tired of being taxed to death, tired of being conscripted for forced labor, tired of having his sons seized by kidnappers for the war, while the rich buy their way out and go "scot-free."

The peasant is neither a Communist nor a member of Chiang Kai-shek's party. He is a man looking for a solution. When the Communists, or anyone else, offer

him a solution, he accepts it. The Communists have helped to give him village democracy and equality against his overlords.

On the basis of that program, Communist rule has spread like prairie fire all over North China in the teeth of all opposition.

American policy doesn't operate in a vacuum or in a world of history books; it operates against a background of reality. Let's look at the record.

During the past year we were engaged in a great war against the Japanese. In China we had two allies. They were two armed parties—one was Communist and the other was the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek. Both were very valuable to us. But there was one terrible perplexing factor—they were both fighting each other simultaneously with the Japs.

Now under Ambassador Gause and General Stilwell our policy was to persuade both the Nationalists and Communists to stop fighting and turn all our strength against the enemy. Then a year ago our policy took a new twist. It was to be complete and all-out support of Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists. It held that Chiang's one-party government was the only legitimate government in China. Therefore, we had to shut our eyes blindly to the fact that vast areas of China were controlled by another government and that

millions of Chinese gave their support to another party.

When the war against Japan ended, we had to torture our deeds to fit our theory. We decided that since Chiang Kai-shek was the man we recognized "legally" as the head of China, our Marines had to go in by force and make sure he re-established his rule over all China—over all those who might not want him as their leader.

The trouble with American policy is this: it has been based too much upon agreements drawn up by powerful men and not upon what the people of Asia want for themselves. Americans have the right to ask of their government right now: Why can't Chiang Kai-shek support himself before his own people? Why do our Marines have to go in and uphold him by their presence? I am neither for nor against anybody in China. I merely hold that Chinese people should have the right to choose whomsoever they want as their government—Chiang Kai-shek or the Communists or anybody else—without intervention by America or the Soviet Union.

The only way to avoid a Communist Asia is to see that the natural aspirations for change of millions of Asiatic peasants have a natural outlet. For a full year, our program has been to support the government of Chiang Kai-shek, which has bucked all change in the villages for a decade—a

government which even during the war was subject to repeated peasant revolts against its regime.

Dr. Judd has posed for us two very terrible alternatives—a dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek or a dictatorship of the Communists—intervention or chaos. Fortunately, these alternatives are not necessarily true. The people of China—I mean the great bulk of the people—want a united, representative, all-party government. They can probably have it if our policy is wise enough. If Chiang can be persuaded to give up his completely unlimited despotic power, if he can subordinate himself to a truly national government, I think, and many others think, that the Communists will in turn lay down their arms and we will have peace.

Our only club is a promise of American cooperation if such a China does develop and the threat of complete American abstention if it does not.

If the Chinese by themselves cannot settle their differences, let's pull our Marines out; let's have no blood on their hands, either American or Chinese. Let them choose in trial by arms what sort of government they want to rule them and then let us judge that China by America's own standards of necessity and decency. (*Applause.*)

Moderator Denny:

Thank you, Theodore White. Now, gentleman, let's get to-

gether around this GE microphone, here. Congressman Judd, would you like to start this discussion?

Congressman Judd: Yes, I'd like to ask Mr. Sheean a question. As I expected, he and, in a lesser degree, Mr. White, claimed that our support of Chiang Kai-shek is intervening in his behalf, but that to do nothing about China or to withdraw would not be intervention against him. Now you know surely that Chiang Kai-shek has had no troops in Manchuria since 1931, when the Japanese drove him out, and in order for him to take back the area that was pledged to him, he's got to get some troops there. There are three ways he can get them there: by land, sea, or air. Now if we won't give him the ships or the airplanes to send troops up there to take back the area we promised him, the only way he can get there is by land. That means he'll have to fight his way through and that means the civil war which we forbid.

Yet you say that not to intervene, to withdraw, wouldn't be helping the Communists. I wonder why you think the American Communists have been picketing the White House, demanding that we withdraw assistance from Chiang Kai-shek if they didn't believe that would be assistance for the Communists in China, intervention in effect, in their behalf.

Mr. Sheean: There seem to be

two questions: How practically could Chiang Kai-shek get his people to Manchuria? And, second, why the American Communists are picketing the White House? I didn't know they were. But the first question about how he could get his troops there would surely be solved if he would make his agreement with the Shantung Communists and the ones higher up. He could get there quickly enough as he's moved his armies all over China for the last 20 years.

Congressman Judd: Well, the only way he could do it would be by fighting with them, wouldn't it? He has asked again and again for a truce and until Mr. Truman recently reaffirmed our established policy, the Communists weren't willing to agree to a truce. Now they have had a death-bed conversion and say they're willing to have one.

Mr. Sheean: They offered one today, in the meeting in Chungking. But, I believe that they had also offered one in November. I am not quite clear in my mind why all the American transport planes had to be at Chiang Kai-shek's disposal suddenly for the first time. They were not so at his disposal during the war against Japan.

Congressman Judd: Because he had to go back there and take over Manchuria from the Japanese armies whom we were pledged to

disarm. He had to go back and take over control. He had to have troops and the only way to get them—

Mr. Sheean: Why wasn't it necessary to fight the Japanese then during the war?

Congressman Judd: He did. We intervened and asked him to send his troops to Haiphong and down into south China and to the Burma Road instead of fighting with Communists. If he'd been interested primarily in keeping control of his country, he wouldn't have been fighting the Japanese alongside of us, but would have been eliminating this rebellion in his own country. Wouldn't he?

Mr. Sheean: The service he is now asking of us would have been more appropriate during the war.

Congressman Judd: We were helping him all we could then, although it wasn't possible for a long time to get much assistance there because 98 per cent of our assistance was going to Europe. But now, my point is that in order to do the thing that we ask him to do, he's got to have assistance from us.

Mr. Sheean: Is it his problem how he's going to occupy his country. If he cannot occupy and control his own country, it should not be done with American Marines. That's all we say.

Mr. Denny: Mr. White has a question here. Mr. White?

Mr. White: I want to ask Dr. Judd a point of national honor. Dr. Judd knows well that during this war the Chinese Communists fought very well on our side. Many of the Chinese Communists were killed saving our boys from Japanese hands. There's many an American airman alive today in America who was rescued from Jap lands by Communists. Is it now to our national honor to send our air force to strafe villages of Chinese peasants? Is it to our national honor to bombard and to shell their homes and their children? Is that honor?

Congressman Judd: No, I utterly disapprove of that just as much as I disapproved of Hitler's doing that to Liddice. But the fact is we didn't kill anybody and even if we didn't kill anybody, I'm still opposed to that policy. But the claim that the Communists did so much valiant fighting won't stand up under the confidential reports of our own information service over there—OSS, G-2, and Naval Intelligence and so forth. I have the documents. While they did a lot of harassing, and of tearing up the railroads, and thousands of minor skirmishes, the Japanese themselves have admitted that only 25,000 casualties, killed and wounded, came from all those years of the Communists allegedly fighting the Japanese.

Mr. Denny: All right. Let's let Mr. Nelson in on this, shall we?

Mr. Nelson: Yes, I've been just sitting here waiting to get into this argument. (*Laughter.*) When I hear Mr. Sheean and Mr. White say that the Chinese didn't fight the Japs, for eight years they've been fighting the Japs.

Mr. White: I never said they didn't fight the Japs.

Mr. Nelson: Well, I certainly understood you to say so. Certainly Mr. Sheean said so. He said that they were fighting in their own interests rather than the interest of licking the Japs.

Mr. Sheean: What I said was that after Pearl Harbor they took a much less active part in fighting the Japs.

Mr. Nelson: They had already been fighting the Japs for six years and the majority of their troops had been killed off. I saw China at that time and, believe me, they were almost destitute. They had been blockaded for years and had nothing to fight with.

Mr. White: Specifically, to repeat what we said, Mr. Nelson, this is it. There were two parties in China fighting the Japanese. There was Chiang Kai-shek's party and there was the Communist party. Both of these parties were our allies. We are now sending our troops to crush one party in favor of another. I maintain that that is intervention. I don't see how you can call it anything else.

Mr. Nelson: But Mr. White, you say "a party." Their party was an

army, and certainly we don't think of a political party in this country as being one that has an army. What would happen if the Republicans and Democrats had their own armies? (*Laughter.*)

Mr. White: What would happen is precisely what is happening in China today. You forget, Mr. Nelson, that Chiang Kai-shek's army is a party army. There are party commissars in every single division, every single regiment.

Mr. Nelson: It's a Nationalist army, Mr. White. It's a Nationalist government.

Mr. White: I have been with that army in the field. I have seen their political commissars operating. Every soldier of that army is a member of the Nationalist party. No other party is legal in that army. It is a party army and it's so claimed.

Congressman Judd: Well, you will admit, Mr. White, that those political commissars and the

schools for enlisting in the Kuomintang party the soldiers in the Nationalist army, have been removed recently and also recruiters for the Kuomintang party in the schools and colleges have been removed.

Mr. White: Absolutely not. That was a promise made that was never kept. I have just come back from China. It is one more of the many broken promises which have never been kept by the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Dr. Judd: Well, then, you disagree very violently with members of our own State Department over there, including some of those that Mr. Hurley was against on other grounds, because he and they agree that there have been those changes in the colleges and in the armies in China.

Mr. Denny: Now, I think this has come to a place where we can pause for station identification.

QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Mr. Denny: I'll start with the lady here on the front row who has a question.

Lady: My question is for Mr. Nelson. I understand that the Communist armies trained their soldiers in reading and writing. Why has not Chiang Kai-shek done the same thing in the time that was at his disposal?

Mr. Nelson: The Generalissimo has trained his people—many of them. I think you'll find that almost as large a percentage of the Chinese, under the central government, have been trained to read and write, as have been in the Communist area, within the limitation of his ability to move around over the territory and get people to do

it. Some sixty million Chinese have been educated in the period just before the war.

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Nelson. Did you want to comment on that, Mr. White?

Mr. White: Yes, I did. I've been with both armies in the field. I've never seen any form of education given to the troops in the field by Chiang Kai-shek's government. I do know that the Communists attempt to teach the people to read and write simple characters.

Congressman Judd: May I suggest that one of the reasons why the Generalissimo hasn't had as much time since the war to develop education, and so forth, is because he's been so busy fighting the Japanese. Let me quote from the Communist publication, *The Communist*, published in Yenan, the Communist capital, October 4, 1938, one year after the beginning of the war. Mao Tseh-tung declared, "Armed struggle is the salient form of China's revolution. The history of our party is the history of armed struggle. Therefore, revolution must take the part of armed struggle." He says further, "The Sino-Japanese war affords our party an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our fixed policy should be 70 per cent expansion, 20 per cent dealing with the Kuomintang, 10 per cent resisting Japan."

Now that's just about what they have carried out. About 10 per cent of their effort was in resisting Japan—enough to be camouflage, enough of their effort to carry on the pretense that they are fighting—while 70 per cent of their efforts went into building up their own people and expanding. I think that's the basic reason. In the period of 1932 to '37, before Mr. White went to China, China made more progress in literacy, and public health development, and so forth, than any people in the world's history has ever made in a comparable period of time. And I challenge anybody to refute that.

Mr. White: I don't know where Dr. Judd got that statement. I just want to give a few facts to him.

Congressman Judd: I was there—in China.

Mr. White: So was I. I've been there since. I just want to water down his eloquence with a few facts. First of all, it may or may not be true that they said that 10 per cent of the effort was to be devoted against the Japanese. But of the Japanese in China—and our own military observers there will tell you—fully 40 per cent of the Japanese troops stationed in China were occupied and were fighting Communists. Those Communists were fighting those 40 per cent of the Japanese troops with no outside aid, with no lend-lease, with

no American supplies whatsoever. They were doing it with their own two hands.

Man: Mr. Sheean. As I understand it, you implied that our Government has not tried to make peace between the Generalissimo and the Communists. Is that your opinion?

Mr. Sheean: That was in the first stage of the policy. The instructions, I believe, to our Ambassadors and to all of our people out there, were to bring about as soon as possible a coalition. But that changed over about a year ago—over a year ago—and under the Ambassadorship of Mr. Hurley that has not been the policy. Certainly in the last three months it hasn't been the policy.

Mr. Nelson: May I say a word there. When you say the policy was changed, I went over there with General Hurley and I got my instructions from President Roosevelt as to what the policy was to be with respect to China. The first thing we said to the Generalissimo and his government was that there must be unity in China. Now if that's a change in policy, I'd like to know it.

Mr. White: It's true enough that we've used the word "unity" about China for a long time. Let me tell you what our policy was in actual practice. There were two parties with armies. They had fought each other for 20 years. Our policy was to say to the Communists, "Lay

down your arms and come out with your hands up. We promise you Chiang Kai-shek won't shoot you." That was it.

Mr. Judd: Isn't it odd that the Communist party is the only party in China that isn't willing to trust Chiang's word to submit this thing to the decision of the people themselves? The Communists have no right to claim that he would destroy them because he hasn't destroyed a single opposition party, and there are several if it had no separate army and would cooperate against the common enemy. Did he destroy Yen Shi-shan or Li Tsung-jen or Fen Yu-hsiang? No, he took them in as soon as they were willing to give up their armies.

Mr. White: The men whom Dr. Judd so quickly rattles off his tongue were not political parties, and he knows it. They were war lords. Chiang Kai-shek can make peace with war lords. As for political parties, it's true there are no others. They've been wiped out. The concentration camps in Chiang Kai-shek's regime are full of men who tried to organize against Chiang Kai-shek.

As a matter of plain fact—and Dr. Judd well knows this—by the laws of the national government of China every single other party is illegal.

Congressman Judd: But the whole point is that Chiang Kai-shek offered on March 1 the

very same three things that President Truman reiterated in his message only two weeks ago. That the first thing that was necessary was to have a cessation of hostilities, a truce; second, a national conference of all parties, including the Communists, to see if they couldn't work out by mutual agreement, a settlement, and third, integration of all the armed forces into one national army.

We didn't ask him to do a thing that he hadn't repeatedly offered to do and the Communists never were willing to yield on the matter of their own independent army.

Mr. Denny: Now, one from the radio audience to Mr. Donald Nelson. "Isn't there a danger," Mr. Nelson—this comes from Miami, Florida—"that China might become powerful enough one day to be a threat to the peace and safety of the United States?"

Mr. Nelson: Well, in my opinion, in answer to that question from our radio audience, I believe that that is so far in the distant future and so remote that I would say that although a possibility, it is not a probability.

Man: Dr. Judd, I think the people in this country would like to know, as a practical proposition, how many American soldiers, sailors, and marines will actually be needed to support the regime of Chiang Kai-shek.

Congressman Judd: Well, I'm not a military expert but I know

that the people who are in charge don't expect any sizeable number. It has been pledged again and again that they will not be used in combat against any outfit in China, Right or Left, unless they are attacked. They're sent there to help disarm the Japanese and hold the ground until the central government can get troops in to take over those areas which we pledged would be returned to them. That's part of the war. The war isn't finished until that's accomplished.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Do you want to talk back?

Man: Yes. What guarantee have we that these Americans won't be used in combat?

Congressman Judd: We have the honor of the men who promised it. I don't have such a low estimate of the integrity of the President of the United States and General Wedemeyer and General Marshall and the others. As a member of Congress I know that the Congress would not support any going back on those pledges.

Mr. White: Let me come to the aid of the questioner. It's quite true that I have just as high an opinion of American honor as Dr. Judd. I also have a very high opinion of the fighting quality of American soldiers. American soldiers and airmen flying Kuomintang troops into Communist territory will inevitably be fired upon. We are forcing those men into

danger. If our troops are fired upon, even by our friends, they will fire back. You know what an American is. We are sending our men into a position from which they cannot extricate themselves except by fire and force, and I maintain that is an untenable position for an honest country.

Congressman Judd: Well, those boys would have had a much harder time landing on the shores of Japan, and being slaughtered if it hadn't have been for the loyalty of the Chinese who held the line for us all these years—in fact, fought for four and a half years on our side before we woke up to the fact that it was our side.

Mr. White: Yes, the Chinese held the line. There were Chinese of two kinds. There were Communist Chinese and Nationalist Chinese and they both died for us.

Lady: Mr. Nelson, what is the difference between Communism in Russia and Communism in China?

Mr. Nelson: Well, I am sorry that I don't know enough about Communism, either in Russia or in China, to answer your question. I think the principal difference is this: the Chinese are individualistic people. The nation has been built around the family, whereas in Russia, Communism is collective Communism. Farms are collective farms, and people work together to produce for the nation. The Russians feel that the Chinese Communists will eventually, as

soon as their status is improved, work for themselves rather than working for the state collectively. That is the best answer I can give to your question, from the Russians themselves.

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Mr. Nelson. Anybody else on the panel care to add to that? Here is a question from Dr. Miltner, formerly on the staff of Peking Union Medical College in Peking, China. He addresses this question to "my good friends of China days." Dr. Judd, "to what extent have the Chinese Communists adopted the Russian theories of Communism?"

Congressman Judd: You have to answer that question by going over a little bit of history. The Chinese Communists are like all other Communists that I have run across. Their policies, their objectives, are fixed. Their procedures are opportunistic. The Chinese Communists came into South China where I lived, and their program was to set up Russian Communism. It was utterly ruthless, but it didn't get much success because the Chinese, for reasons Mr. Nelson has just outlined, rebelled too strenuously against abolition of all rights of private property and against regimentation.

So the Communists changed their policy—their program—and they have changed it a second time. They are like a man going across the lake against the wind in a sail-

boat. If he runs into a headwind, he can't go straight ahead, so he tacks right or left for the moment, but he is still going across the lake. If I had time I would like to read to you a statement by Edgar Snow on that, who knows as much about it as anybody else. He said, "Anybody who says the Chinese Communists don't have the ultimate objective of communizing China is either a fool or he is ignorant regarding the Communists in China."

Mr. Denny: Thank you, Dr. Judd. Now, Mr. White, how about your tackling that question?

Mr. White: Oh, yes! You can call the Chinese Communists people who are taking a boat across a lake against strong winds. The people who are riding on that boat are a group of peasants who see in that boat the only means of getting some decency out of life. The people who are riding on this boat and are following the Chinese Communists are people who have never been given the slightest vestige of dignity or decency in their daily lives and they are willing to follow any leadership right now.

The Communists have found that the most successful form of leadership in China at the present moment, is to offer them a basic village democracy. They let the people elect the governments in the village. It isn't an American democratic system, nor is it a Rus-

sian democratic system. There was a newspaper man in Yenan just last week, and he reported the conversation of one of the Communist leaders who said, "Yes, we are Communists." He admitted it. He said, "But there are various kinds of Communism. Ours will be Chinese. It's different from the Russian." I maintain again, that whatever form of government the Chinese people want to have they should have.

Mr. Nelson: May I just say to Mr. White—he keeps talking of the Chinese people wanting certain things. Of course, they do! But there is no communication in China. Most of the people in China don't know that this difference is there. Sure, the people want to increase their living standards. For thousands and thousands of years, they have been mistreated. Now they want better things. It's my firm conviction that the Generalissimo wants that just as much as the Communists do and that his method of getting it will be just as much in favor of the Chinese people themselves as the Communists. I am certain of that.

Man: I would like to ask Dr. Judd a question. Do you imply that if American aid to Chiang is withdrawn his government will surely fall to the Communists?

Congressman Judd: No. I said that if it is withdrawn there will certainly, in my judgment, be civil

war. You don't go out and start a war if you don't have some hope of success. If the Russians don't support the Communists, as they have pledged they won't and I have no reason to assume that they will not keep their pledge, then the Communists are hard-headed enough to know that they can't succeed. It would be folly and suicidal for them to attempt starting a civil war. I am not saying that Chiang will fall. I think he will win over the long run, but there will be disorder and chaos in China which is against everybody's best interest.

Man: Mr. Sheean. Not a word has been said about religious beliefs as they will affect the policy of China. Is there some word that you might give us that would indicate to us what part religion will carry in determining the policy of China—their own policy?

Mr. Sheean: I don't think so. I am not aware of any religious movement at all in China that's new or contemporary with these events except that of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the so-called "New Life Movement," which hasn't played very much of a part.

Mr. Nelson: I'd like to answer just this way. I've had many talks with the Generalissimo about it—one I recall on a bright, moonlight night in Chungking, looking up the valley at the rice ponds. For three hours the Generalissimo sat

talking to us about Christianity and its effect on China.

The Generalissimo today is a devout, ardent Christian. I believe that the missionaries that have gone to China have played a very important part in teaching and giving inspiration to the leaders of China—particularly, the young ones that are coming along.

Man: I'd like to ask Mr. White a question. Have you heard, as I did in the last week, the statement that we're really helping both sides—the Chinese Communists through Russia and the Chinese Nationalists direct?

Mr. White: No, we aren't—our aid is just for one party. I've never been able to understand why. We're aiding Chiang Kai-shek alone.

Mr. Denny: Thank you. Congressman Judd, here's a question from Winter Park, Florida. "Is the policy of transporting troops and supplying war material to the Chungking government consistent with our duty to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of other nations?"

Congressman Judd: Mr. Denny, I discussed that at some length in my speech. I think that we had no choice between intervening or not intervening. It isn't a question of whether we are going to be on one side or the other. If we aren't on this side, automatically we are on that side. To stay in is to intervene and to withdraw is to inter-

vene. Therefore, it's not a question of our departing from a historic policy. It's a question of our maintaining a historic policy. It's the Communists, in their rebellion against the legitimate government instead of becoming a loyal opposition party and working from within, who are making the trouble. If somebody comes back and says, "But think of all the Chinese that Chiang Kai-shek has killed," all I can answer is that Abraham Lincoln killed even more in his desperate attempt to save this Nation from being split, and Chiang Kai-shek will not yield on that question. He'd be a traitor to China if he were to yield on the matter of a split government—two Chinas just in order to avoid civil war.

Mr. White: Let's have a few more facts. There is this phrase that's being used—"a rebellion against a legitimate government"—there is no such thing as a legitimate government. Twenty years ago, there was an alliance between the Communist party of China and the Kuomintang party of China. Both of those armed parties marched north and seized the Yangtze Valley from the war lords who occupied it then. Then in a monumental act of treachery, three days after those two parties had seized Shanghai together, Chiang Kai-shek unleashed his legions against the Communists and drove them underground. It was

one of the greatest acts of treachery in history. Ever since then, the Communists have been underground. They have never accepted Chiang Kai-shek's word from that day to this. It is legitimate government simply because we recognized it as based upon force. Those are the facts.

Congressman Judd: I'd have to differ with that a little bit to ask Mr. White, "Was he there in 1927?" Actually, Chiang put down a rebellion. Chinese Communists openly talked about being able to pull off in Shanghai at that time and in Nanking something comparable to the October revolution in Russia. He succeeded in putting it down, just as Abraham Lincoln succeeded, after a long struggle, in putting down a rebellion in this country. But Chiang has always said, as Abraham Lincoln said, "If you're willing to come along, we'll work together." But he also said—I have the quotation here—he said, "If I die a dictator, I will go down to oblivion as all other dictators have gone. But, if before I die I manage to give back power to the people, I shall be remembered in every Chinese home."

Mr. White: Abraham Lincoln never set up concentration camps throughout the northern United States. He never executed students for the possession of Southern literature. Abraham Lincoln never had a gestapo that went into every home, and that seized pro-

fessors from their universities for what they said in class. Abraham Lincoln was a democrat.

Mr. Sheean: And he didn't believe in torture, either.

Congressman Judd: However, that's assuming that these things that have happened in China are the result of something that Chiang Kai-shek did. That's one of the difficulties of people who haven't had long periods of time in China during times of peace. They go to China and they look at the mess and they say, "My, what a terrible government produced all this." They don't know that this isn't a mess that Chiang Kai-shek's government produced. This is the mess that he inherited and has been struggling with. Actually, it's infinitely better now than it ever was before in China's history.

Mr. Denny: Now, Vincent Sheean, may we have your summary?

Mr. Sheean: Mr. White stated the situation in the form to which I also subscribe that we, the Americans, made war with two organized Chinese parties as allies. These parties are the Kuomintang and the Communist party, and that we in recent months have shifted our support and supplies to one side, only. I'm misstating that. We never did supply the Communists, but we did recognize them as a combat ally at one point. We no longer do. Now our supplies and our support go entirely to the party

of Chiang Kai-shek—the dictatorship.

We've also said in reply to questions that the Communists base their power upon the support of poor peasants. It's rather dubious how Communist they are. Mr. Nelson was told in Moscow that they weren't, in an orthodox sense, but in any case, whether their leaders are Communist or not, they reach for the poor peasants and it's from them that in the north and the northeast they've got their support. In the midst of much argument, that's been the main thesis of this side.

Mr. Denny: Now, Congressman Judd, for your side, please.

Congressman Judd: In summary, I should like to use less than a minute, Mr. Denny. It's my conviction and Mr. Nelson's conviction that unless clear evidence develops that the Chiang Kai-shek government is not acting in good faith, every consideration of American honor and of legitimate self-interest requires that we continue to support what President Truman has called the only legal government in China, helping it to finish the war and helping it in its efforts to achieve unity and democracy in a strong, independent China. America's past was in Europe. America's future is not going to be in Europe, it's going to be in Asia, where a billion people live, gigantic manpower and resources and markets.